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Size Matters:  The Impact of Physician Practice Size on Productivity 
 
Abstract 
Physician practices in the US are largely small-scale, independently-run enterprises, 
despite their potential critical role in creating a more integrated health care system.  Using an 
approach that builds on – and extends – prior research, we estimate physician practice production 
functions for different types of practices (multispecialty, single-specialty, and six subspecialties 
within single-specialty practices).  We find that these practices have distinct production 
functions, and that size has different implications for each.  In particular, we find that the median 
size physician practice is well below the size suggested by the estimated production function and 
marginal products of physicians, for almost all practice types. These results have interesting 






A contradiction exists at the core of the efforts to improve the US health care system.  
Almost all health care reform proposals have envisioned that physicians and their practices will 
be integral parts of a more efficient and effective health care delivery system (American 
Academy of Family Physicians, American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of 
Physicians, American Osteopathic Association, March 2007; Christensen et al., 2009; Daschle, 
2008; Robinson, 1999; Tollen, 2008).  Yet, physicians seem reluctant to practice in the large 
organizations needed to effect the integration envisioned in these proposals. 
We suspect that the answer to this contradiction may lie in the inherent economics of 
physician practices.  That is, small practices may be more productive – and profitable – than 
large practices.  On the other hand, large practices may be more productive, but physicians may 
be willing to sacrifice profits in order to achieve other goals more readily attainable in small 
practices (such as professional autonomy and control).  To test these ideas, in this paper we begin 
the search for the “optimal” size of physician practices, by examining the structure and 
performance of physician practices.  We will demonstrate that the production functions of 
physician practices (and thus the marginal products of physicians) differ by practice type and 
specialty.  As a result, multiple optimal sizes of physician practices may exist. 
In Section 1 we describe the environment of physician practices in the US and provide a 
brief history of recent attempts to integrate physicians into larger health care organizations.  
Section 2 reviews the major research to date on physician practice size and places our analytical 
framework in the context of this research.  Section 3 describes our data and estimation strategy.  
In Section 4 we present descriptive statistics and the empirical estimates from our model.  In 




1. The Context 
Physician services currently constitute 21% of national health expenditures in the United 
States (Hartman et al., 2009), and many have asserted that – through the power of their referrals, 
hospital admissions, orders, and prescriptions – physicians have effective control over the bulk 
of health care spending (Sirovich et al., 2008).  Paradoxically, physicians wield this influence 
despite the fact that, in most instances, they practice largely in small-scale, independently-run 
enterprises.  The demise of solo practice has been heralded for decades, but nevertheless a large 
percentage of physicians remain solo practitioners.  According to the American Medical 
Association (Smart, 2004), only 10% of physicians were in group practice in 1965; by 1986 that 
percentage had increased to 31.9%.  It appeared then that group practice was becoming the 
predominant mode of practice.  However, this trend appeared to stall out after 1986, with only 
30.2% of physicians in group practices in 2003.  Data from the American Medical Association 
also demonstrate that group practices are still relatively small, with 69% of group practices in 
1994-95 and 65% of group practices in 2003 having between 3 and 6 FTE physicians.  On the 
other hand, using the Community Tracking Study, (Liebhaber and Grossman, 2007) found a 
statistically significant decline in the percentage of physicians in solo or 2-physician practices, 
from 40.7% in 1996-97 to 32.5% in 2004-05.
1
  They found the decline to be most prominent for 
specialists (both surgical and medical) rather than for primary care physicians. 
It has been argued that physicians need to agglomerate into larger and more integrated 
practices.  Many consider multispecialty group practices such as Kaiser Permanente and the 
Geisinger Health System to be the ideal structure for the physician practice of the future, with a 
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 Unpublished data from the Medical Group Management Association indicate that the pre-1986 trend continued, 
with 67.1% of physicians in group practices in 2003.   This large discrepancy suggests underreporting of group 






balance of primary care and specialty physicians, supported by a full range of clinical and 
ancillary services and administrative infrastructure (Shih et al., 2008).  Others argue that single-
specialty groups can match the quality and efficiency of multispecialty groups (Casalino et al., 
2004).  One recent analysis has found that small practices will be disadvantaged in increasingly 
popular pay-for-performance programs because they lack sufficient patient caseloads to 
demonstrate statistically reliable measures of superior performance (Nyweide et al., 2009). 
In the past two decades, at least two major attempts have been made to consolidate 
physicians into large groups.  The first was the rapid rise (and fall) of for-profit physician 
practice management companies (PPMCs).  The 1990s saw the launch of dozens of PPMCs 
dedicated to the acquisition and management of physician practices.  The PPMC business model 
was based on the premise that these companies could exploit cost savings through economies of 
scale and centralization, expanded access to capital, and bargaining clout with managed care 
companies.  Almost all of the PPMCs foundered within a few years as the purported benefits of 
their business models failed to materialize, and either ceased operations or transformed their 
business models (Burns, 1997; Reinhardt, 2000; Robinson, 1999). 
The second major attempt at physician aggregation was the acquisition of physician 
practices by hospitals and health systems.  With the growth of managed care in the 1990s, many 
hospitals and health systems were concerned that they might be excluded from payer contracts.  
As a result, they felt the need to migrate many of their medical staff (especially primary care 
physicians) from the informal relationships represented by traditional hospital privileges and 
credentialing to more formal relationships including practice acquisition (Robinson, 1999).  Even 
after the restrictive managed care environment receded in the early 2000s, many hospitals 




retail supply chain (Halley, 2007).  Unfortunately, many hospitals found that they were 
sustaining operating losses on these practices in excess of $80,000 per physician, and responded 
by divesting the practices (Healthcare Advisory Board, 1999). 
That both of these efforts – one well-funded and predicated on expected profit 
opportunities, and the other formulated by insiders and created for supposed strategic advantages 
– have largely failed, combined with the limited organic growth of group practices, suggests that 
the economics of physician practices may be more complicated than expected.  Perhaps the 
presumed economies of scale and scope of larger physician practices are illusory.  That is, the 
small physician practice may in fact be an economically robust enterprise; if so, this sector will 
remain fragmented for the foreseeable future.   
2. Analytical Framework 
The optimal size of a physician practice follows from – but is not coincident with – the 
profitability of the practice.  Profitability, of course, stems from two sources – the extent of 
demand (as measured by volume purchased and price paid) and the nature of the practice’s 
production function.  This paper focuses on the structure of the production function for physician 
services as a first step in determining practice size optimality. 
The structure of physician practices has generated episodic interest of economists and 
health service researchers over the past three decades.  The research of relevance to the current 
study has focused on three areas:  optimality as determined by survivor analysis; practices as 
organizations; and production function estimation.  Frech and Ginsburg (1974) and Marder and 
Zuckerman (1985) applied survivor analysis to physician practices, under the hypothesis that the 




multispecialty group practices may be of optimal size (although solo practices may still be 
efficient, at least in certain parts of the U.S.). 
Other researchers have analyzed the physician practice as a firm.  Madison and Konrad 
(1988) analyzed the growth and evolving organizational structure of large medical group 
practices.  Using a typology based on “organizational tradition” and “market-response strategy,” 
they identified the expected internal conflicts within large physician practices as the practices 
respond to changing market demands.  Pauly (1996) argued that the primary competitive 
advantage of multispecialty group practices is likely to be in coordinating the process of care 
(especially in a managed care environment), rather than any inherent economies of scale or 
scope.  Getzen (1984) posited a “brand-name” theory of the firm applied to physician practices.  
Town et al. (2004) examined in considerable detail the role of incentives in physician groups, 
concluding that a single comprehensive theory of incentives within practices may not be possible 
because of the complexity of physician utility functions and practice production functions. 
A considerable – and varied – body of research has focused on the estimation of 
physician production functions.  Some have focused on input mix and interdependency, others 
on economies of scale or scope.  The seminal work was conducted by Reinhardt (1972), who 
estimated a transcendental production function for physicians.  He used the individual physician 
– rather than the practice – as the unit of observation, and measured output by total patient visits, 
physician office visits, and patient billings – rather than impact on the patient’s health (arguing 
that physician services are intermediate goods, rather than final goods). 
Gaynor and Pauly (1990) used stochastic production frontier analysis to estimate both 




of incentives on productivity.  Pope and Burge (1996) used the Reinhardt production function to 
estimate significant increasing returns to scale for single-specialty practices.  Using stochastic 
production frontier analysis, DeFelice and Bradford (1997) found that primary care physicians in 
both solo and group practices produced less than the optimal number of patient visits per week, 
and that the differences between the two practice modalities were statistically – but not 
economically – significant. 
Two studies deserve particular attention because of their relevance to our work.  The first, 
Thurston and Libby (2002),  applied a generalized linear production function to the Reinhardt 
construct.  This functional form allows for zero values for inputs, which is helpful in estimating 
production functions for physician services given the large number of small practices that do not 
employ all types of non-physician clinical providers.  This function also facilitates estimation of 
the marginal productivity of inputs, as well as of Hicks elasticities of complementarity.  Thurston 
and Libby used the physician as the unit of observation, and implicitly assumed that the 
physician services production function was homogeneous across practice types (i.e., 
multispecialty vs. single-specialty practices, and subspecialties within single-specialty practices).  
They used office visits and total patient visits as the measures of output.  The model found that 
all of the estimated marginal productivities were positive, and that the three kinds of non-
physician labor included (administrative and clerical, nurses, and technicians and aides) were 
complements with physician labor. 
The second study of note – Rosenman and Friesner (2004) – applied data envelopment 
analysis to explore the efficiency of physician practices.  Unlike most previous studies, they used 
the physician practice, rather than the individual physician within a practice, as the unit of 




sample” (which included single-specialty primary care practices, multispecialty practices with 
primary care physicians only, and multispecialty practices with both primary and specialty care), 
and the “specialty care sample” (which included single-specialty specialty care practices, 
multispecialty practices with specialty care only, and multispecialty practices with both primary 
and specialty care).  Using data from the 1998 Medical Group Management Association Annual 
Cost Survey, Rosenman and Friesner used three measures of output:  “surgical and nonsurgical 
procedures and services done inside the practice’s facility;” “surgical and nonsurgical procedures 
and services done outside the practice’s facility;” and “total ancillary (diagnostic, radiological 
and laboratory) procedures and services performed by the practice.”  The data envelopment 
analysis showed that single-specialty practices were more efficient than multispecialty practices, 
with the inefficiency due primarily to technical (rather than allocative) inefficiency.   In addition, 
single-specialty practices had higher average scale efficiencies than multispecialty practices. 
We build on – and extend – this line of research in several ways in the present paper.  
First, we adopt the generalized linear production function introduced into this literature by 
Thurston and Libby.  As noted earlier, this model allows for zero inputs (such as advanced 
practice nurses, which many physician practices do not employ but who are becoming 
increasingly important in health care delivery), and allows for input complementarity and 
substitutability.
2
    This function has the form:    
Qt = F(Xt) = F(X0t,X1t, … ,XKt) =  Σ   Σ  αij √Xit  √Xjt ,           (1) 
where Xt = (X0t,X1t, … ,XKt) is the vector of inputs at time t (with X0t = 1 everywhere) and αij = 
αji.  As Thurston and Libby demonstrate, (1) can be rewritten as: 
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 The generalized linear production function does have the limitation of imposing constant returns to scale to the 
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Qt =   Σ   Σ  βij √Xit  √Xjt .                                                                                                             (2) 
        (2) 
In this case, αij = βij for i = j, and αij = βij/2 otherwise.  Equation (2) can be estimated using least 
squares regression methods. 
Second, we follow Rosenman and Friesner by treating the physician practice – rather than 
the individual physician – as the unit of observation.  Most of the previous research recognized 
that individual physicians worked with other clinicians, but assumed (at least implicitly) that 
production was driven by the individual physician.  Research cited above note the critical role of 
organizational behavior in the production process; even though practices may be small and even 
atomistic, it is clear that the nature and structure of the production of medical care is determined 
by the firm. 
Third, as has been recognized in the literature, we argue that physician practices are not 
homogeneous.  For instance, single-specialty practices may have significantly different 
production functions from multispecialty physician practices.  It can be argued that 
multispecialty practices seek scale in order to create an “ecosystem” of physicians, so that 
primary care physicians can refer their patients mostly to specialists within the practice, and in 
turn specialists in the practice can rely on their primary care colleagues for a full practice of 
referred patients.  In addition, different kinds of single-specialty practices (primary care, medical 
subspecialty, surgical subspecialty) may themselves have different production functions.  
Primary care practices (i.e., family practice, internal medicine, and pediatrics) are usually office-
based, in which they provide mostly cognitive services (also known as evaluation and 
management services); some (but not many) primary care practices offer revenue-generating 





diagnostic and treatment procedures in their own facilities.  Many medical specialties (such as 
cardiology and gastroenterology) and almost all surgical practices (e.g., orthopaedic surgery, 
neurosurgery, and urology) concentrate on major procedures; in fact, many practices own and 
operate their own diagnostic or surgical facilities, which provide potential for both practice 
efficiencies (e.g., optimizing the use of physician time) and profit (e.g., billing for technical as 
well as professional services).  Other facility-based single-specialty practices (e.g., 
anesthesiology, pathology, and radiology) typically provide services in facilities owned and 
operated by others (e.g., hospitals) often on an exclusive contractual basis, and often have office 
space only for billing and collection functions.
3
  These substantial structural differences among 
physician practices suggest that both the “nature of the firm” (as elucidated by Coase (1937) ) 
and the “theory of the business” (as proposed by Drucker (1994)) in physician practices are not 
uniform. 
Finally, we present an alternative measure and/or interpretation of output.  Many of the 
studies cited above use total physician visits or office visits as their measure of output.  These 
have the disadvantage of omitting major services (e.g., surgical procedures for surgical practices 
and interventional procedures from medical specialists).  Unfortunately, there exists no single 
measure of total output of physician practices, or a recognized index of practice services.  
However, we do have total revenue from a practice.  Given the nature of the physician services 
market, we can assume that physician practices are price-takers.  After all, the primary payer for 
most practices (Medicare) reimburses physicians uniformly through the Resource-Based Relative 
Value Scale (RBRVS) system, and many other payers use that payment methodology as well.  
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We can also assume that practices of the same structure (i.e., all multispecialty groups or all 
single-specialty groups of a particular specialty) will have the same distribution of payer.
4
  Under 
these assumptions, we can use total revenue as a proxy for total output. 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1. Data 
Like Rosenman and Friesner (2004), we use data from the annual Medical Group 
Management Association (MGMA) Cost Surveys.  Since its founding in 1926, MGMA has 
collected and reported practice revenue and expense information on an ongoing basis.  Since 
1979, the annual MGMA Cost Survey has used a similar questionnaire and definitions to 
facilitate year-to-year comparisons. Questionnaires are distributed to medical practices that have 
an MGMA member, as well as to physician practices that register with MGMA to participate in 
the survey.  The survey contains over 130 questions that summarize a practice’s financial 
statements in a standardized manner to provide a comprehensive financial description of the 
organization’s revenue and expenses.  The survey response is similar on a year-to-year basis and, 
considering the complexity and length of the questionnaire, is considered reasonable.  In 2008 
10,535 questionnaires were distributed (by postal and e-mail), and 1,679 responses were received 
for a 15.9% overall response rate.  The overlapping survey respondent population and stability in 
the survey questionnaire contribute to consistency in the data report.  MGMA Cost Surveys are 
widely accepted by federal agencies and academic researchers as an accurate and comprehensive 
source of data on the financial performance of medical group practices (Pope et al., 2006; 
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 For example, we can assume that all single-specialty pediatric groups will have the same payer distribution (mostly 
private insurance and Medicaid, with little or no Medicare), and that all single-specialty cardiology practices will 




Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2002).   These surveys are 
described in more detail at (Medical Group Management Association, 2007).  
We use Total Gross Charges as our measure of production output.  MGMA defines Total 
Gross Charges as the sum of gross fee-for-service charges (defined as “the full value, at the 
practice’s undiscounted rates, of all services provided to fee-for-service, discounted fee-for-
service and non-capitated patients for all payers”
5
) and gross charges for patients covered by 
capitation contracts (defined as “the full value, at a practice’s undiscounted rates, of all covered 
services provided to patients covered by all capitation contracts, regardless of payer”
6
).  Total 
Gross Charges is superior to collections or revenue from a theoretical perspective because 
charges are more indicative of practitioner performance whereas collections are influenced by 
the ability of the practice to collect from payers.  Total Gross Charges is superior to Relative 
Value Units (which are used to generate the RBRVS system) from a practical perspective, 
because only about 1/3 of respondents to the MGMA Cost Survey report RVUs for their practice.  
Finally, because we use three years of data, we deflate Total Gross Charges (scaled in millions 
USD) by the Medical Care Services price index. 
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 Gross fee-for-service charges includes:  professional services provided by physicians, non-physician providers, and 
other physician extenders such as nurses and medical assistants; both the professional and technical components of 
laboratory, radiology, medical diagnostic and surgical procedures; contractual adjustments (such as Medicare charge 
restrictions, third-party payer contractual adjustments, charitable adjustments, and professional courtesy 
adjustments); drug charges; charges for supplies consumed during a patient encounter inside the practice’s facilities; 
facility fees; charges for fee-for-service services allowed under the terms of capitation contracts; charges for 




 Gross charges for patients covered by capitation contracts includes: fee-for-service equivalent gross charges for all 
services covered under the terms of the practice’s capitation contracts, including:  professional services provided by 
physicians, non-physician providers, and other physician extenders such as nurses and medical assistants; both the 
professional and technical components of laboratory, radiology, medical diagnostic and surgical procedures; drug 





We use six measures of inputs:  the full-time-equivalent (FTE) number of physicians 
involved in clinical care in the practice; the FTE number of mid-level providers
7
 involved in 
clinical care in the practice; the FTE number of clinical staff
8
 in the practice; the FTE number of 
ancillary staff
9
 in the practice; the FTE number of office staff
10
 in the practice; and annual capital 
expenditures
11
 in the practice.  In addition, we include a binary variable that identifies if 
physicians were the majority owners of the practice. 
The combined 2005-2007 MGMA data set included 4,830 observations for the years 
2004-2006.  We eliminated 480 practices because of missing values of input and output 
variables, and 580 because of missing group identification numbers. Finally, we assumed that 
physician practices require non-zero FTE physicians and capital expenditures to create output, 
which eliminated 256 observations.  This process left us with a total of 3,514 observations, of 
which 2,389 are unique physician practices. 
3.2. Estimation Strategy 
We estimate Equation (2) above as our empirical model.  We are interested primarily in 
the coefficients for the independent variables measuring physician services, since one of our 
main purposes will be to evaluate the marginal productivity of physicians. We do not impose the 
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 Mid-level providers include: non-physician providers who are specially trained and licensed providers who can 
provide medical care and billable services, such as Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists, dieticians/nutritionists, 
midwives, nurse practitioners, occupational therapists, optometrists, physical therapists, physician assistants, 
psychologists, social workers, speech therapists, and surgeon’s assistants. 
 
8
 Clinical staff include:  registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, medical assistants, and nurse's aides. 
9
 Ancillary staff include: clinical laboratory, radiology and imaging, and other medical support services. 
 
10
 Office staff include: general administrative, patient accounting, general accounting, managed care administrative, 
information technology, housekeeping/maintenance/security, medical receptionists, medical secretaries-transcribers, 
medical records, and other administrative support. 
 
11
 Capital expenditures are defined as annual costs for information technology (practice-wide data processing, 
computer, telephone and telecommunications services), building and occupancy (i.e., general operation of buildings 
and grounds), and furniture and equipment.  Because we use three years of data, we deflate Capital expenditures 




non-negativity of βij ex-ante; the βij are to be determined ex-post by the model. The time effects 
capture the macro elements affecting growth of gross charges (Qt).  
In a cross-sectional setting, the βij can be readily estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression, as in Thurston and Libby (2002).  However, for OLS estimates to be 
consistent, we need to make the assumption that the error term is uncorrelated with input 
variables. One potential source of bias violating this assumption may be from “managerial bias,” 
although part of this potential bias is controlled through the ownership type variable in our 
model.  
The data give us a limited panel component to study medical practices’ production 
behavior
12
. We estimate both the fixed effect and random effect model on the whole sample. The 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects model yields a test statistic of 
309.81, far exceeding the critical value (χ
2
 (1) = 3.84), which implies that estimating a classical 
regression model of a production function with a single constant term is inappropriate. From a 
fixed effects estimation, the F statistic (p-value close to 0.00) for testing the joint significance of 
the firm effects is strongly in favor for a firm specific effect in data. The Hausman specification 
test shows that the hypothesis that the firm specific effects are uncorrelated with the other 
regressors cannot be rejected (p-value = 0.13), suggesting that the concern for “managerial bias” 
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 We abstract from issues related to selection bias. The MGMA Cost Survey relies on self-reporting from 
physicians practices and is not intended to follow a particular medical practice over time. We confirmed that the 
distribution of the observable variables, including numbers of physicians and total gross charges, are similar for 





is not a serious problem in our model.  We thus conclude that the random effects model is a 
better choice, which is also more efficient in using our highly unbalanced panel data
13
. 
As noted above, we hypothesize that the production function is heterogeneous among 
different types of physician practices.  We tested this hypothesis by estimating the production 
function with practice type dummy variables as well as interaction between the dummy variables 
and physician input variables.
14
  We then conducted a Wald test on the joint significance of the 
estimated coefficients of the interaction terms.  The test statistics (distributed as χ
2
 (7)) strongly 
support our hypothesis.  For example, in testing the null hypothesis that the marginal product of 
physicians in single-practice specialties and multi-specialty practices is the same, we estimated 
the all-practice model included interactions involving a single-practice dummy variable.  A test 
of the joint significance of the interaction terms revealed that the Wald statistic was 52.10, with 
p-value less than .01.  We also tested this null hypothesis for the six subspecialties within single-
specialty practice types; under almost all cases, we reject the null hypothesis at the .01 level.
15
 
Therefore, we confirm that the marginal product of physicians is indeed different across practice 
types.  As a result, we estimate the random effects model using generalized least squares 
regression, separately for all group practices, all multispecialty group practices, and all single-
specialty practices, as well as six different types of single-specialty practices (family practice, 
pediatrics, cardiology, orthopaedic surgery, obstetrics/gynecology, and anesthesiology). 
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 Fixed effect estimation exploits within-group variations, which is inefficient in our setting where a substantial 
number of practices appear only once over the three years.  Estimation results from fixed effects model are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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).  We interacted Practype with only the physician input variables, because our primary 
interest, the marginal product of physicians, does not depend on the other input variables. 
15
 We conducted a total of 15 joint significance tests on the coefficients of interactions.  The complete results are 





4.1. Summary Statistics 
We begin the empirical analysis by examining the characteristics of the 3,514 
observations in our sample.  Table 1 presents summary data on the size of these practices, as 
measured by the number of FTE physicians.  For the entire sample, the mean size was 22.1 FTE 
physicians, with a median of 8.5; the smallest was 0.2 FTE physicians and the largest was 991.3.  
Data not presented in the table show that 10% of the sample had 2 or fewer FTE physicians per 
practice, which is notable because the source of the data (the Medical Group Management 
Association) is a trade association that represents group practices. 
TABLE 1 GOES ABOUT HERE 
Table 1 also illustrates the dramatic size differences between multispecialty and single-
specialty group practices.  The mean/median size of multispecialty practices in this sample was 
52.1/28.0 FTE physicians, almost five times the mean/median size of single-specialty practices 
(11.1/6.5 FTE physicians).  Note, however, that size distribution of these practice types overlaps 
to a considerable degree.  The largest single-specialty practice (235.0 FTE physicians) exceeds 
the size of 75% of multispecialty practices, and the size of the 75
th
 percentile of single-specialty 
practices in the sample exceeds the size of the 25
th
 percentile of multispecialty practices.  These 
differences suggest that the fundamental characteristics of multispecialty and single-specialty 
physician practices (such as business models and production functions) may be different as well; 
as a result, separate model estimation may be merited. 
Table 1 reveals that size differences exist among single-specialty practices, as well.  




practices.  As noted above, primary care practices are usually office-based, and the bulk of their 
services are office visits by patients, rather extensive procedures; as a result, scale may not be of 
economic or strategic advantage.  Medical (cardiology) and surgical (orthopaedic surgery and 
obstetrics/gynecology) practices are larger; these practices are focused on major procedures, and 
often involve ownership of diagnostic or surgical facilities.  The largest single-specialty practices 
(anesthesiology) are facility-based, often provide services on an exclusive contractual basis, and 
require office space only for billing and collection functions.  These differences in size and 
practice characteristics among single-specialty physician practices suggest that it may be 
worthwhile to estimate separate production functions for each kind of practice. 
Table 2 reveals even more differences among physician practices, in terms of the 
variables used in the production function model estimation.  The mean physician practice among 
the 3,514 in the sample had $9.4 million in total gross charges per year from its 22.1 physicians 
(for an average of $424,300 per physician), and spent $700,000 on capital expenditures.  This 
practice employed 13.9 FTE ancillary staff, 27.2 clinical staff, 51.6 office staff, and 6.2 midlevel 
providers.  75% of the responding practices were owned by physicians. 
TABLE 2 GOES ABOUT HERE 
This mean practice masks the significant differences among practices.  The differences 
between multispecialty and single-specialty practices are even more dramatic than simply size, 
as indicated in Table 1.  The mean multispecialty practice generated over three times the total 
gross charges as the mean single-specialty practice, but with almost five times the number of 
FTE physicians; as a result, the mean multispecialty practice produced 29% less charges per FTE 




practice employed more ancillary, clinical, and office staff and fewer midlevel providers than did 
the mean single-specialty practice.  If one can assume that multispecialty and single-specialty 
practices have the same maximand and same level of efficiency, then it is likely that their 
production functions are different. 
As with practice size, the subspecialties within single-specialty practices differ dramatically 
in terms of practice characteristics.  Family practices had the lowest mean total gross charges and 
charges per FTE physicians, and the fewest midlevel providers; in addition, they were the least 
likely (by far) to be physician-owned (36%, compared to the single-specialty practice average of 
80%).  Cardiology practices had the highest mean total gross charges, the second-highest mean 
charges per FTE physician, and the highest mean level of capital expenditures; in addition, they 
employed the highest mean number of FTE ancillary, clinical, and office staff.  Anesthesiology 
practices had the lowest capital expenditures, and employed the fewest FTE ancillary, clinical, 
and office staff; however, they employed the most midlevel providers (primarily, Certified 
Registered Nurse Anesthetists).  Orthopaedic surgery practices generated the highest mean level 
of charges per FTE physician, and were the most likely (at 98%) to be owned by physicians.  As 
with the other summary data, these differences support the conjecture that the structure and 
production functions of physician practices are likely to differ by specialty. 
4.2 Empirical Estimates 
Given these summary results, we turn to the results of the generalized least squares model 
estimation.
16
  Table 3 presents the results of the model estimation for all practices, all 
multispecialty practices, and all single-specialty practices in the sample.  The results for each 
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model are very different.  We examine the direct and interaction effects separately.  For the 
direct effects, the physician input variables (number of FTE physicians [MD] and the square root 
of FTE physicians [MD
½
]) are statistically significant (at the .05 level) in both terms for only 
single-specialty practices; only MD is statistically significant for the all practices model; and 
neither variable is significant for the multispecialty practices model.  For the capital input 
variable, the direct coefficients are statistically significant for only the all practices model.  One 
of the office staff input variables (Off
½
) is statistically significant with the multispecialty and 
single-specialty models, but not with the all practices model.  The clinical staff input variables 
are statistically significant only with the single-specialty model.  None of the ancillary staff input 
variables is statistically significant in any of the three models.  Finally, of the mid-level provider 
variables, one (Mid) is statistically significant in all three models, and the other (Mid
½
) is 
statistically significant in the single-specialty practice model. 
TABLE 3 GOES ABOUT HERE 
Examination of the interaction effects between the physician input variable (MD
½
) and 
the other input variables indicates that only the interactions between the physician variable and 
the capital and clinical staff variables are statistically significant for the all practices model.  The 
interactions between the physician variable and the ancillary staff and mid-level provider 
variables are statistically significant for the multispecialty practice model, but not for the single-
specialty practice model.  Conversely, the interactions between the physician variable and the 
office and clinical staff variables are statistically significant for the single-specialty practice 




Finally, the physician ownership variable is statistically significant for all three models. If 
we evaluate the numerical significance of this variable ceteris paribus (at the means of all the 
other explanatory variables), we find that physician ownership increases productivity (as 
measured by total gross charges) by a total of $2,078,000 per year (or $94,000 per physician) for 
all physician practices, a total of $1,370,000 per year (or $26,000 per physician) for all 
multispecialty physician practices, and a total of $710,000 per year (or $64,000 per physician) 
for all single-specialty practices.  These increases represent a productivity premium of 22%, 7%, 
and 12% of total gross charges, respectively.
17
  The per FTE physician productivity gains from 
physician ownership are estimated to be $94,000 for all practices, $26,000 for multispecialty 
physician practices, and $64,000 for single-specialty practices. 
The results presented in Table 3 confirm that physician practices are not homogeneous in 
terms of production functions, and that multispecialty and single-specialty practices should be 
analyzed separately.  Table 4 decomposes single-specialty practices into six subspecialties:  
family practice, pediatrics, cardiology, orthopaedic surgery, obstetrics/gynecology, and 
anesthesiology.
18
  In general, the results confirm that the production functions differ among 
subspecialties.  As we did with the previous models, we examine the direct and interaction 
effects separately.  For the direct effects, at least one of the physician input variables is 
statistically significant (again, at the .05 level) in four of the subspecialty models (family 
practice, pediatrics, orthopaedic surgery, and anesthesiology).  The capital variable is significant 
in three models (family practice, orthopaedics, and anesthesiology); the office staff variable is 
significant in two models (pediatrics and anesthesiology); the clinical staff variable is significant 
                                                          
17
 The total productivity gains from physician ownership in multispecialty practices are larger (at a .10 level of 
statistical significance) than that of single-specialty practices. 
 
18
 As Table 1 shows, these six subspecialties represent 1,526 (59.7%) of all single-specialty practices in the sample.  




in two models (pediatrics and obstetrics/gynecology); the ancillary staff variable is significant in 
three models (pediatrics, orthopaedic surgery, and anesthesiology); and the midlevel provider 
variable is not significant in any of the six models. 
TABLE 4 GOES ABOUT HERE 
Few of the interaction effects between the physician input variable and the other input 
variables are statistically significant (even at the .10 level) in the six subspecialty practice 
models:   with capital in the cardiology and anesthesiology models; with office staff in the 
orthopaedic surgery and obstetrics/gynecology models; and with clinical staff in the orthopaedic 
surgery model.    In none of the models were the interactions between the physician input 
variable and ancillary staff or mid-level providers statistically significant. 
Finally, none of the physician ownership coefficients was statistically significant in the 
subspecialty single-specialty models.  These results are not surprising for subspecialties such as 
cardiology and orthopaedic surgery, for which only 2-3% in the sample are owned by non-
physicians.  Nevertheless, these results are unexpected for family practice and pediatrics, given 
the high degree of significance in the all practice and all single-specialty practice models. 
Although the generalized linear production function has a certain elegance, the multitude 
of coefficients makes it difficult to interpret the impact on any one input on production.  (In the 
model tested here, each input appears in the estimated model seven times.)  Since physician labor 
is the driver of most physician practices and since most discussions of firm size related to 
physician practices are couched in terms of number of physicians, we chose to analyze the 
models shown in Tables 3 and 4 in terms of how production is affected as the number of 




nine models; that is, we measured the slope of the estimated production function relative to the 
number of FTE physicians for each model (entering the value in the two direct and five 
interaction terms), holding the other inputs (capital and staffing) constant at their sample means. 
The results of our calculations of the marginal product of physicians are presented in 
Figure 1.  As is apparent visually, the marginal product of physicians varies dramatically across 
the different types of practices.  We consider each panel in turn.  In the all practices model, the 
marginal product of physicians is negative until the practice reaches 8 FTE physicians; that is, 
total product actually declines as the practice grows from 1 to 8 physicians.  As Panel 1 also 
shows, the median size of all practices in the sample is 8 FTE physicians.  Panels 2 and 3 reveal 
that this pattern is reversed when multispecialty and single-specialty practices are estimated 
separately.  In the multispecialty practice model (Panel 2), marginal product is monotonically 
decreasing but does not approach zero.  The overall single-specialty model (Panel 3) shows a 
very similar marginal product curve, even though the two kinds of practices have significantly 
different average products (see Table 2) and median sizes (28 FTE physicians for multispecialty 
practices and 6.5 FTE physicians for single-specialty practices). 
FIGURE 1 GOES ABOUT HERE 
Panels 4 through 9 show the marginal products for the 6 subspecialties that were 
modeled.  Panel 4 indicates that the marginal product of physicians in a family practice decreases 
monotonically, and reaches zero at 24 FTE physicians.  The median family practice size is 6.5 
FTE physicians.  Pediatrics, on the other hand, shows the opposite pattern (Panel 5).  The slope 
of the marginal product is monotonically positive, and marginal product itself is negative until 




Cardiology (Panel 6), the only medical subspecialty in the sample, follows the pattern of the all 
single-specialty practices model (Panel 3):  marginal product decreases monotonically but does 
not approach zero.  Orthopaedic surgery (Panel 7) follows pattern of the all practices model 
(Panel 1):  The marginal product of physicians is negative until the practice reaches 9 FTE 
physicians (the median orthopaedic surgery practice has 8 FTE physicians); that is, total product 
actually declines as the practice grows from 1 to 9 physicians but grows monotonically after 
reaching that size.  Obstetrics/gynecology (Panel 8), which is a specialty with elements of both 
primary care and surgery, has a marginal product curve that resembles family practice (Panel 4).  
Marginal product decreases monotonically, and reaches zero at 36 FTE physicians (the median 
obstetrics/gynecology practice has 5 FTE physicians). Finally, as Panel 9 indicates, 
anesthesiology follows the pattern of the orthopaedic surgery model:  monotonically positive 
slope, with negative marginal product until the practice reaches 6 FTE physicians (the median 
anesthesiology practice has 20 FTE physicians). 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The results presented above demonstrate that the structure and production functions of 
physician practices differ substantially by type of practice.  Multispecialty practices are different 
than single-specialty practices, and the subspecialties within single-specialty practices have 
different production functions.  These findings suggest that each kind of physician practice has a 
different “theory of the business” (Drucker, 1994), and that size has different implications for 
different practices.  For instance, multispecialty practices gain by size through the creation of an 
internal referral network among their physicians, and through the capture of ancillary services 





Within single-specialty practices, we see a range of value of size.  Family practices, for 
the most part, have few opportunities to generate production (and revenue) beyond direct patient 
care and cognitive services.  As a result, family physicians have little to gain from size in terms 
of care or revenue.  The organizational complexities of larger size (and the attendant perception 
of loss of control by each physician as the practice grows) will rapidly overcome any limited 
production advantages.  These findings help explain why earlier attempts to aggregate and 
integrate primary care practices (by national physician practice management companies, as well 
as local hospitals and health systems) failed. 
For other single-specialty practices, size can be an advantage.  In orthopaedics, size can 
enable subspecialization within the practice (such as hand surgery, spine surgery, and sports 
medicine), as well as the acquisition of ancillary services (e.g., advanced imaging [CT, MRI], 
physical therapy and rehabilitation) and ambulatory surgery facilities.  These services can 
improve the productivity of individual practitioners as well as the entire practice, and can expand 
sources of revenue.  In a different way, single-specialty anesthesiology practices can gain from 
size.  There is some subspecialization within the field (e.g., pediatrics, critical care medicine) and 
some opportunities for adding ancillary services (e.g., pain management).  However, the main 
advantages to size for anesthesiology practices are the combination of low capital and operating 
costs (because the physicians perform most of their services in facilities that they do not operate) 
and the prospect of exclusive contracts for services with hospitals and other facilities (which 
value the ability to secure regularly scheduled physician services through contract rather than 
credentials). 
It needs to be noted, however, that not all of the findings in this research have been as 




these practices should be like anesthesiology or orthopaedic surgery practices.  However, 
pediatrics in reality is more similar to family practice in structure and production possibilities:  
Production and revenue are driven primarily by frequent office visits with established patients 
and consultations with parents.  Similarly, we expected single-specialty cardiology practices to 
exhibit a production function similar to orthopaedic surgery (but perhaps on a smaller scale):  
Size would allow for subspecialization (e.g., interventional cardiology and electrophysiology) 
and some ancillary services (such as stress testing and cardiac catheterization).  Yet, the 
estimated model found no such effects. 
The results presented in this paper suggest a potential paradox:  The median size of actual 
physician practices is considerably smaller than expected by estimated production efficiencies.  
For example, both the all practices and the single-specialty orthopaedic surgery practice models 
found that the median practice size (8 FTE physicians) was at the minimum estimated level of 
production.  All of the other models estimated that the size of the median practice was well 
below that expected from the estimated marginal products of physicians.  We have two 
hypotheses for this behavior.  First, physicians may have personal preferences for smaller 
practices.  This hypothesis combines the classic target income hypothesis (as exemplified by 
McGuire and Pauly (1991) and Rizzo and Blumenthal (1994)) with the hypothesis that 
physicians may seek to maximize non-profit-related goals such as professional autonomy and 
service to patients (May, 1983; Starr, 1983).  That is, physicians may be willing to sacrifice more 
production – and more income – in return for other personal and professional interests.  If this 
hypothesis is confirmed, those who advocate for size and integration of physician practices to 




The second hypothesis is that physician practice size may not be rewarded in the market.  
A production function that rewards size is, in effect, a necessary but not sufficient condition for a 
profit-maximizing (or even profit-satisficing) function that rewards size.  A firm, after all, is 
assumed to be interested in maximizing profit, not production.  Nevertheless, the results shown 
in this paper demonstrate that a physical opportunity for growth exists for some (if not all) 
physician practices.  If this finding holds, health care reform proposals that expect that physician 
practices must become larger and more integrated will need to identify or create incentives for 
practices to expand (through internal growth or merger).  Fortunately for these proposals, the 
analysis in this paper did not find that physician practice production functions favor small size 
(the solo and 2-physician practices that represent the plurality of practices in the US), which 
would have made the task of integration would much more difficult – and costly. 
 
To conclude, this paper has attempted to extend the analysis of the structure of physician 
practices in three ways.  The first advance is that we analyzed the practice – rather than the 
individual physician – as the unit of observation.  Although physicians often render their services 
on a one-to-one basis with their patients, increasingly the care itself is produced by a team of 
health professionals.  In addition, with physicians practicing in increasingly formal 
organizations, the practice is a firm as defined by Coase (1937) and Drucker (1994), and should 
be analyzed as such.  The second advance is that – unlike previous research on the production of 
physician services – we estimated total production by the firm, not individual services (such as 
office visits).  Third, by using the annual surveys conducted by the Medical Group Management 
Association, we had the advantage of a large enough sample to allow analysis at a finer level of 




specialty practices separately.  In addition, we were able to model six subspecialty practice types 
within single-specialty practices:  family practice, pediatrics, cardiology, orthopaedic surgery, 
obstetrics/gynecology, and anesthesiology.   
This paper does have a number of limitations.  First, because the MGMA survey is 
conducted of its membership of organized physician practices, it contains relatively few solo and 
two-physician practices.  As a result, our analysis may not be as robust for these smaller 
practices.  Second, even with access to three years of data, our sample size is still small enough 
that some single-specialty practices of interest (i.e., general internal medicine, gastroenterology, 
general surgery, and radiology) cannot be included in the analysis. 
Finally, as noted earlier, identifying the structure of the physician practice production 
function is just the first step in determining whether or not an optimal size of physician practice 
exists.  Nevertheless, the analysis presented here provides the foundation for the next phase of 
the research – the analysis of “contribution margin” (i.e., total gross charges for the practice 
minus all costs except physician compensation) – which, after all, is the real focus of a profit-
maximizing practice. 
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